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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to increase understanding of the sources of observed gender 
disparities in retirement savings.  We use administrative data for the Wisconsin Deferred 
Compensation (WDC) program and data from a survey of WDC participants to analyze 
predictors of the observed gender disparity in WDC account balances. WDC is a tax-deferred 
voluntary retirement 457 plan offered to individuals holding jobs covered by Wisconsin’s public 
pension system.  Thus, observed gender differences in account balances is not due to women’s 
less likely coverage by a traditional pension plan or a voluntary defined contribution plan.   
Using WDC administrative data, we find that female and male employees are equally 
likely to participate in WDC, but women contribute a smaller percentage of salary than do men 
with the same salary and of the same age.  Our survey of WDC participants confirms this 
finding.  Even when controlling for other family and employment factors, women contribute a 
smaller share of salary.  Lower contribution ratios are an important reason for lower WDC 
account balances of women.  However, when taking account of contribution rates, age, salary 
and years of WDC covered service, gender remains predictive of lower average WDC accounts 
for women. There is some, though limited evidence, of gender differences in investment 
strategies. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
This project was initiated by Shelly Schueller, Deferred Compensation Director at the 
Department of Employee Trust Funds (ETF) and Margery Katz, ETF Librarian.  It would not 
have been possible without their enthusiasm and cooperation.  Shelly was instrumental in our 
being approved to receive and analyze WDC and ETF data.  The research reported herein was 
performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) funded as part 
of the Financial Literacy Research Consortium. The opinions and conclusions expressed are 
solely those of the authors and do not represent the opinions or policy of SSA, any agency of the 
Federal Government or the State of Wisconsin, or the Center for Financial Security at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison.  3 
 
 
Introduction 
The persistence of greater economic vulnerability of older women has been well 
documented (Munnell, 2004).  Vulnerability has been attributed in part to the longer lives and 
greater risk of widowhood for women in a society in which those risks are not adequately 
protected by insurance purchases or social transfer programs (Hartmann and English, 2009; 
Herd, 2009; Holden and Brand, 2003; Johnson et al., 1999).  Other literature documents gender 
disparities in labor market choices and opportunities; women have more interrupted work 
careers, receive lower wages when they do work, and are more likely to work in jobs that have 
no or less generous pension coverage than do working males (Hartmann and English, 2009; 
Holden and Fontes, 2009, Shaw and Hill, 2001).  There is some but more limited evidence that, 
even when offered the same savings opportunities, women may be less likely to save for 
retirement.  The Employee Benefit Research Institute’s (EBRI) 2012 retirement confidence 
survey found that, while women and men are equally likely to participate in a retirement program 
when offered and to say they are currently saving for retirement, women are more likely not to 
have calculated how much they need in retirement, despite longer lifetimes, and more likely to 
feel they are behind in their savings (Heman, et al., 2012).   Although this may suggest women’s 
lower propensity to save for retirement, these findings would be consistent with lifetime 
employment patterns that would find women with lower savings when interviewed, even if 
employed at that time in pension covered jobs offering the same savings opportunities available 
to male workers.  Madrian and Shea (2001) examine 401(k) participation behavior among 
workers in firms that offer this voluntary option and find the women are less likely to participate 
and contribute a smaller percentage, although those differences diminish for younger cohorts of 4 
 
workers. 
1  These authors have only administrative firm data and so cannot assess whether these 
differences are due to work and family characteristics that are associated with gender or to 
gender alone.  Bajtelsmit et al. (1999) investigates the share of retirement wealth allocated to 
defined contribution pension plans when covered also by a defined benefit pension (DB) plan.  
The authors found a gender difference that cannot be explained by compositional differences.  
Men increase allocations to defined contribution pensions while women reduce theirs.  The 
authors conclude that reduced allocations to defined contribution plans are gender related: 
One way to assess the relative importance of the factors that contribute to the lower allocation of 
wealth to [defined contribution plans (DCPs)] by women is to consider the following example. If 
the sample mean characteristics for women are applied to the coefficients of the men’s equation, 
the allocation to DCPs is predicted to be 33.8% of wealth compared to the sample average of 
27%. This would bring the female allocation to DCPs very close to the mean for men which is 
35%. On the other hand, if women were assumed to have the same characteristics as the sample 
average for men, and these mean values were applied to the estimated coefficients of the women’s 
equation, the predicted proportion of wealth in DCPs would increase to only 27.9%. Thus, the 
gender differences in the allocation of wealth to DCPs are largely due to gender (p. 8) 
 
This is the question we explore in this paper: whether the smaller account balances held 
by women with Wisconsin Deferred Compensation (WDC) accounts is due to differences in 
savings behavior of male and female employees or to differences in characteristics that may vary 
systematically by gender, including age, salary, years of work, and marital status.  In the next 
section, we describe the WDC program and the gender difference in account balance that 
motivates this study.  We analyze administrative and survey data on account balances to assess 
differences in contribution behavior.  We then describe the more limited evidence on fund 
                                                 
1 Their study focuses on the effect of automatic (opt-out) versus voluntary (opt-in) on participation, contributions, 
and fund choices.  The gender differences are notable in voluntary plans, the findings that are relevant to the present 
study.  5 
 
account allocation and contribution cessation.  In the final section, we draw conclusions and 
make some program policy recommendations.   
 
Wisconsin Deferred Compensation Program:  
Overview. The Wisconsin Department of Employee Trust Funds (ETF) administers 
employee benefits, including pensions, that are offered by all Wisconsin state agencies and 
public universities as well as by most local governments and school districts. With the exception 
of limited-term employees and those working less than one-third time, public employees are 
covered by the Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS).
 2  This mandatory pension plan uniquely 
pays the higher of a benefit based on a pension formula or an annuity based on accumulated 
contributions and investment earnings.
3  Employees in a job covered by WRS may also be 
eligible to participate in the Wisconsin Deferred Compensation Program (WDC). Authorized 
under the s. 457 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, the WDC is a supplemental, tax-favored, 
retirement savings program for government employees.  
                                                 
2 The major exceptions are the City of Milwaukee and Milwaukee County, which administer their own separate 
pension systems.  With the exception of some protective service workers, all public employees in Wisconsin are 
covered by the federal Social Security program (Old Age, Survivor, and Disability Insurance) 
3 WRS is not a typical defined benefit pension plan.  The monthly amount paid to a separating employee, eligible for 
a retirement benefit is equal to the higher of a “formula benefit” or an annuity purchasable with the account 
accumulations based on past employer and employee contributions plus fund earnings. This is not a defined 
contribution plan, however, since the account accumulations may only be annuitized, investments are managed by 
the State of Wisconsin Investment Board, and a single level of account earnings is applied across all accounts. 6 
 
  WDC was created with the passage of the Wisconsin State Laws of 1981, with this option 
first offered to all state employees in 1983.  1983 legislation permitted local governments to offer 
the WDC to their employees, though they are not required to do so (Wisconsin Department of 
Employee Trust Funds 2009).
4  Individuals, as long as they are in a WRS-covered position, may 
elect to contribute any amount to WDC subject to the federal annual maximum limitation and 
may alter amounts, cease, or resume payments with very few administrative limits. 
 Wisconsin 
state agencies may offer only the WDC as a tax-deferred retirement savings option. However, 
local units of government may provide other competing 457 plans and the University of 
Wisconsin (all campuses), community colleges, and public school districts may offer their 
employees the option to contribute to both the WDC and 403(b) plans. 
The WDC shares some characteristics with other tax-deferred options, such as 401(k) and 
403(b) programs.
5 See Appendix A for a comparison across the benefit plans to which Wisconsin 
public employees may have access.  Like a 401(k) or 403(b) plan, WDC contributions and 
interest gains are tax-deferred until distribution  Contributors must be active employees of the 
institution offering the plan.  However, there are some important differences. WDC withdrawals, 
allowed upon separation from government employment, are not subject to the early withdrawal 
penalty prior to age 59 ½ (although ordinary income tax rules will apply). Withdrawals prior to 
                                                 
4 Approximately 70 percent of eligible non-state public agencies offer the WDC to their employees (Wisconsin 
Department of Employee Trust Funds 2009).   
5 These plans are named after the section of the IRS code that defines what qualifies each plan for tax-favored 
treatment.  457 plans cover government workers, 403(b) plans cover education sector workers, and 401(k) plans 
private sector workers.  7 
 
age 59 ½ from a 403(b) account generally result in a 10 percent income tax penalty.  In addition, 
WDC withdrawals may be issued as an annuity (partial or full), as a lump sum, or as periodic 
withdrawals.  Annuitization is not a permanent decision; annuitants may switch to other forms of 
payout or reverse that decision. Although there is an identical maximum contribution limit 
permitted by IRS rules for all these plans, the contributions to the WDC (or any 457 plan) are not 
limited because of simultaneous 401(k) or 403(b) contributions. Thus, contributing to both a 457 
and a 401(k) or 403(b) can potentially double the annual permitted tax-deferred contribution.
6  
All plans have identical “catch-up contribution provisions” that apply to individuals 50 years old 
and above, but 457 plans offer an additional option permitting somewhat more generous 
contributions in the three years prior to retirement. Important to understanding account activity is 
that the WDC offers rollover options (to and from IRAs as well as other qualified plans such as 
403(b) plans) as well as financial emergency hardship withdrawals that may be allowed under all 
tax-deferred plans at the employer’s discretion.  WDC does not currently allow loans against 
accounts.  
It is important to note that the WDC is a supplemental retirement savings plan offered to 
employees only if they work in a WRS covered position and thus is offered to employees already 
covered by a mandatory defined benefit plan.  Cessation of employment in a WRS covered job 
requires cessation of WDC contributions, although funds can be left in the WDC account and 
                                                 
6 Thus someone covered by both a 457 and a 401(k) or 403(b) plan may contribute the maximum allowed to both 
plans.  This does not apply to simultaneous 401(k) and 403(b) plan coverage in which case the single maximum 
applies to the combined amount. In 2010 and 2011 the maximum contribution was the greater of 100% of taxable 
income or $16,500, with individuals over age 50 allowed to contribute an additional $5,000 per year. 8 
 
will continue to receive (tax-deferred) investment earnings and can be transferred among 
investment options.  
The integration of WDC with WRS coverage extends to WDC administration and 
oversight, with both the WDC and WRS benefits overseen by the Department of Employee Trust 
Funds. The WDC Director is a Wisconsin state employee and data on eligibility for WDC 
participation is provided by the WRS staff.  The Deferred Compensation Board (Board)
7 and 
ETF have statutory authority for program administration and oversight.  The Board selects the 
investment options offered by the WDC and contracts directly with investment providers.  The 
Board annually reviews the performance of the investment options to determine if they continue 
to meet established performance benchmarks.  Although WDC has a separate website and 
newsletter, WDC news is included on the ETF website and publications assuring that all WRS 
participants have access to information about WDC. The Board contracts for administrative 
services through a competitive bid process.
8  
Gender Disparities in WDC account balances: WDC Annual Reports: WDC annual 
published reports for 2006–2010 have consistently shown lower balances held by women 
participants.  Table 1 reproduces annual reported account balances.  Whether these are due to 
different contribution patterns or to underlying differences in career and salary trajectories of 
women and men is not explored in these reports. The number of account holders suggests that 
                                                 
7 The WDC Board is a five member board whose members are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the 
Wisconsin State Senate.     
8 The current contract is with Great-West Retirement Services (GWRS) through November 30, 2015.  GWRS 
employees provide individual and group counseling services.  GWRS also provides and manages the on-line 
services for participants to monitor accounts and change allocation of accounts among offered investment funds.. 9 
 
participation rates may not be a factor.  However, equal numbers of male and female 
participants, may be a consequence perhaps of equal participation rates but could also represent 
different rates for different sized employee groups.
9   
[Table 1 about here] 
 Factors that may drive balance differences and can be investigated with our data include:  
  lower salaries of female employees,  
  lower contribution rates at a given salary,  
  fewer years of eligibility (i.e., WRS coverage),  
  interruptions in contributions made to WDC even as eligibility continues, 
  pre-retirement withdrawals through financial emergency withdrawals, 
  different investment choices that result in lower returns, and  
  roll-overs into and out of other tax-deferred accounts 
  
Study Design 
Population Studied. We analyze the WDC contribution behavior of State of Wisconsin 
employees, which is approximately 45 percent of WDC account holders. This restriction was 
made for several reasons.  First, not all WRS-covered local (non-state) public employers elect to 
offer the WDC to their public employees.  However, all State of Wisconsin employees are 
eligible to contribute to the WDC.  Second, for state employees, the WDC is the only optional 
tax-deferred program offered.  Thus for them, but not for university and technical college 
employees who may have s. 403(b) options, WDC administrative data provide complete 
                                                 
9 Equal number of participants is consistent across all ages. 10 
 
information on their participation in employer-provided tax-deferred options.  It is only for state 
employees that WDC eligibility is known with certainty and for whom WDC contribution data 
provide information on their retirement savings made through pre-tax salary reduction.  
Administrative Data: Our analysis of WDC participation and contributions is based on 
administrative data for WDC account holder.  The data are for individuals employed by 
Wisconsin state agencies who had accounts as of December 31, 2009.  WDC administrative data 
included total contributions and fund activity during the year as well as account balances at the 
end of each calendar year, which could be zero for individuals who first contributed after 2006.  
These administrative data had limited information beyond items necessary for fund management 
For information on employment (e.g., wages, agency of employment) required linking WDC 
information to WRS employment records.  
For our analysis, we excluded from the full sample of 22,059 account holders individuals 
over 65 years of age in 2009, those who were above the 99
th percentile in earnings and hours 
during the year of interest, and those who were below the 1 percentile in earnings and hours 
during the year of interest. The higher earners and hours were excluded because the state pension 
formula incentivizes higher earnings in the three years before retirement.  Lower earners and 
hours were trimmed in order to reduce the bias in earnings due to those who started or terminated 
work near the end or beginning of the year as we have no information on how hours were 
distributed over the calendar year.  
Survey of WDC participants: In addition to the administrative data, we sent mail surveys to 
a randomly selected sample of 2,000 individuals who were Wisconsin state employees and WDC 
participants, drawn from the WDC administrative data and to a sample of 1,000 Wisconsin state 
employees who are eligible to but were neither in the administrative files of participants not 11 
 
currently participating as indicated in ETF records from which the sample was drawn. We 
received useable responses from 1,280 individuals, for an overall response rate of 43 percent.  
Not surprisingly, the response was somewhat higher from those who had WDC accounts at 47 
percent than those who were not account holders at 40 percent.
10  The eight-page mail survey 
asked questions about the individuals’ income, other family savings and wealth, current 
employment, and WDC account balances. Other questions were designed to obtain data on the 
initial participation decision, reasons for delays after initial eligibility in WDC enrollment or for 
not enrolling at all, history of changes in participation and contributions made, and on spouse’s 
or partner’s income and work. The survey was distributed in April and May of 2011.   
The analysis sample of the survey data excludes respondents who were at the time of the 
survey over 65 years of age or younger than 25.  We also trimmed a few unreasonably high 
contributors and those who reported no longer working in 2010 for the State of Wisconsin.  
Those not working in that year would not have been eligible to contribute to WDC in 2010, the 
focal year of our analysis.
11  In this paper we analyze only the participant sample as we are most 
                                                 
10 Strict IRB conditions do not permit us to calculate differential response rates by individual characteristics.  By 
State law WRS data cannot be shared externally, including to UW researchers, unless it is for the direct benefit of 
the system.  Thus our research plan had to conform to the IRB requirement that our analysis have clearly stated 
WRS benefit outcomes.  For this reason we, unfortunately, were not able to link survey and administrative data.   
11 We also conducted four focus groups of WDC female participants, with participants identified from the WDC 
administrative data just described. The primary use of focus groups for this research study was to understand in 
greater depth the family, financial, and employment contexts within which the WDC participation decision was 
made. We report some supporting results from the focus group discussion in this paper, with a more detailed 
discussion in Holden and Koch (2012). 12 
 
interested in how this complements the administrative data analysis which is only for WDC 
participants. 
Effects of Political Events on Data:  In early 2011, as we were preparing the survey, 
Wisconsin’s governor proposed removing collective bargaining rights for virtually all public 
employees in Wisconsin, requiring state employees to pay at least 12.6 percent of their health 
care costs, and mandating state employees to pay 50 percent of their pension contributions 
(Office of the Governor Scott Walker 2011). These changes were estimated to result in take-
home wage reductions of 11.8 percent on average (Office of the Governor Scott Walker, 2011).
12 
The Governor also called for a pension study committee that would examine converting the 
defined benefit Wisconsin Retirement System plan to a define contribution plan, thereby adding 
more uncertainty to future pension distributions for current workers.
13 These proposals became 
law, and state workers first saw their take-home wages reduced in August 2011.  We can only 
surmise the effect of the proposal on survey responses but would expect it had some influence on 
response rates with individuals more dependent on WRS and WDC for future retirement security 
to respond with greater probability.   
                                                 
12  Legislation became effective in July 1, 2011 with deductions for increased health insurance premiums and WRS 
contributions first reflected in paychecks dated August 25 for biweekly payrolls or September 1, 2011 for monthly 
payrolls. 
13 Constitutionally, already achieved pension benefits cannot be reduced.  Thus past service benefits could not 
change, but future pension accrual could.  In addition by State law, benefits paid to an annuitant cannot be reduced 
below the initial “core fund” amount paid at retirement.  In Wisconsin Fund gains result in benefit increases and 
fund investment losses result in cutbacks in prior investment increases.  13 
 
Sample Restriction Effects:  To provide assurance that the restriction of the study to 
only state employees does not reduce the gender disparity in account balances that motivated this 
study, in Table 2 we compare mean account holdings of women and men among all WDC 
account holders as reported in WDC annual reports (rows 2 and 3) with mean accounts of only 
Wisconsin state employees, based on WDC administrative data. The last row shows the same 
measures for the survey study sample of WDC participants.  
  While state employees on average had somewhat higher balances than did all WDC 
account holders, the gender disparity in account balances is almost identical. The ratio of female 
to male account balances in 2009 among state employees was .69 compared to .73 in 2009 and 
.70 in 2010 among all WDC account holders. As among WDC account holders, almost exactly 
the same numbers of male and female state employees have WDC accounts.  The restriction in 
age and the additional restriction by hours of work and earning, which defines our WDC 
administrative data “Study Sample,” does not change the basic finding of gender disparities in 
average account balances.  As expected, respondents to the survey had larger accounts on 
average, but the same gender disparity remained.  Interestingly, the respondent numbers are 
gender balanced even though these are a consequence of both WDC participation and response 
rates. 
[Table 2 about here.] 
Data Analysis  
  Participation in WDC: As stated above, the equal numbers of male and female 
participants in WDC need not imply equal probabilities of participation. Unfortunately, WDC 
administrative data are for participants only, so we are unable to examine participation rates with 
those data.  The survey data are also inappropriate since we do not know the full size of the 14 
 
eligible group of men and women from which the samples were drawn.
14   ETF was able to 
provide aggregate numbers eligible (i.e., individuals in WRS-covered jobs) by gender, agency, 
and county of employment.
15   We use these data to explore whether the way human resource 
staff provide information to employees might be a factor in enrollment probabilities.
16  Table 3 
presents these aggregate data on participation in WDC. Almost 60 percent of all WDC-eligible 
employees have WDC accounts, with 90 percent of employees with accounts in 2009 
contributing to those accounts.   
[Table 3 about here] 
To explore whether agency policies influence these aggregate participation rates, we 
broke down employees into their respective state agencies.
17  As we expected, participation rates 
vary greatly across state agencies.  Among agencies with more than 1,000 eligible state 
                                                 
14 The IRB approval did not allow us to access data from which the nonparticipants were drawn.  Names of those 
sampled by ETF were given directly to the Survey Center which conducted the interviews.  
15 Data by county and agency are not entirely consistent with state totals since individuals who work in more than 
one agency and more than one county will be double counted in agency/county-specific totals.  It appears that 
approximately 14 percent of state workers are employed in 2009 in more than one agency and in more than one 
county.   
16 WDC staff were interested in whether cross-agency differences in numbers enrolled represented meant that some 
agencies were more or less likely to provide information on or to encourage enrollment in WDC.  Our hypothesis is 
that if this is the case, it could also extend to some agencies having different rates of enrollment among their male 
and female employees. 
17 This analysis was undertaken in part because discussions with ETF suggested strong agency effects on 
participation probabilities; that is, that certain agencies encourage WDC participation more than may other agencies 
either explicitly or by offering more information through seminars and meetings with human resource personnel. 15 
 
employees, the Department of Transportation has the highest participation rate at 61.5 percent 
and Department of Veteran Affairs the lowest at 33.7 percent.  We hypothesized that, if state 
agency policies are a major factor in participation rates, then these agency differences would be a 
major factor in explaining participation rate differences across counties.  These rates also vary 
across Wisconsin counties.  Among those with more than 1,000 eligible state employees, Brown 
County registers participation at 51.0 percent compared to 35.0 percent in Milwaukee.
18 We do 
not have data on eligible males and females by county and agency and, thus cannot directly 
examine “agency effects” on participation by gender. We calculate a “standardized participation 
rate” for each county assuming a distribution of employees in the county across agencies 
identical to that in Dane County.
19 If agency policy uniformly encouraged higher or lower 
participation within the agency, then this standardization would sharply reduce inter-county 
variation. 
  Our participation analysis required a selection of counties and agencies such that each 
agency was represented in each of the counties (see Appendix B for a list of the 13 counties and 
                                                 
18 These participation rates are calculated as WDC state employees with a home address in that county as a percent 
of state employees working in an agency in that county.  To the extent that individuals live in another county than 
the one in which they work, these rates are not precise measures of “county employees” participation.   
19 This is akin to age-standardization when studying population phenomenon—e.g., mortality rates.   Standardizing 
by age leads to an estimate of the total number of deaths that would be due to mortality alone if the age distribution 
were identical to that of the reference population.  Dane County is the seat of the Wisconsin state government and 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison.  Similarly, in this exercise we calculate the number of participants expected if 
the employee distribution across agencies was identical to the reference (Dane) county.  In both cases an overall rate 
is calculated by dividing all deaths (or participants) by the population (or eligible) total.  16 
 
9 agencies). Table 4 shows the divergence in the actual and standardized county participation 
rates from the Dane County rate.  Brown County, for example, has a participation rate (across the 
nine agencies) that is 6.54 percentage points higher than in Dane County. If the distribution of 
Brown County state employees eligible to participate in WDC across agencies were the same as 
for Dane County, then the overall participation would be higher by only 3.01 percentage points. 
Thus, while the agency employment pattern contributes to the higher participation in Brown 
County than Dane County, employees in these state agencies are on average more likely to 
participate in the WDC in Brown County than in Dane County.  
[Table 4 about here] 
  Removing the effect of agency distribution does not always diminish the difference 
between Dane County and other counties. In Douglas County, for example, the difference 
would even be greater with identical agency distributions. This suggests that while inter-agency 
effect may be important, intra-agency differences – the decisions individuals make about 
participation – are the driving force in observed participation rate differences across agencies. 
We note here that the survey data, which  included current agency of employment, does not find 
an agency effect on contribution rates, continuity of contributions and account balances.  
Although current agency may not be the agency  where the employee initially employed or 
enrolled, we would expect strong agency effects to persist among longer term agency 
employees and to have effects on current behavior (contributions, fund choices) that would 
influence current balances. 
Account Balances. From WDC administrative data, we can observe the behavior of 
individual WDC account holders  during 2006-2009. Gender disparities in fund balances 
(shown earlier in Table 2) may result from several factors observable in these data: differences 17 
 
in WDC contributions at given salaries, in fund growth rates net of new contributions, and in 
contribution persistence over time. We explore the potential contribution of each of these 
factors.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Contribution differences.  To examine contribution behavior among WDC account holders, we 
define the contribution ratio, the ratio of annual WDC contributions to WRS covered wages paid 
in that same year.
20 Table 5 shows the average contribution ratio for males and females who 
contributed to the WDC. In all years, the mean ratio is significantly higher for male contributors.  
Consistent with survey respondents having larger accounts on average is their higher 
contribution ratios.  Nevertheless, female survey respondents reported contributing significantly 
less to WDC as a percent of salary than did their male colleagues.  These ratios are considerably 
below the maximum individuals are eligible to contribute, which, in 2009, was the lesser of 
$16,500 or 100 percent of earnings.  Table 6 shows the hypothetical contribution-wage ratios that 
would be observed if all employees in the administrative data study sample contributed the 
allowed maximum.   Women, because of their lower average salaries, could contribute a higher 
percentage of their salary on average to WDC than could their male colleagues.  In other words, 
the same dollar level in contributions will be a higher ratio of salary at lower salary levels.   
[Table 6 about here] 
                                                 
20 This ratio is definable only for individuals with both a positive wage and contribution amount in the relevant year. 
Ratios based on administrative data are exact calculation of that ratio.  Survey data may be influenced by response 
bias and error. 18 
 
  Table 7 attempts to distinguish the effect of gender—the inherent difference in 
contribution behavior of women and men—from other gender-related attributes, using both 
administrative and survey data. The dependent variable is the contribution-wage ratio, for only 
those with a reported positive WDC contribution and WDC covered wage.
21 The basic estimate 
includes earnings ($30,000 - $50,000 the excluded category) and age (ages 40-49 excluded).
22  In 
specification 2, we include a full-time work variable to capture the unobserved preferences that 
determine both hours of work and contributions.
23  Specification 3 also includes a variable that 
identifies those who worked an unusual average number of hours per week that are not consistent 
with typical work, earnings, and contribution behavior.
24 The survey data allow an estimate of 
marriage effects, and we also include education level.  We first describe the WDC administrative 
data analysis and follow with a comparable analysis of survey data. 
[Table 7 about here] 
                                                 
21 Estimates for the years 2006-2008 are available from the authors.  They do not change the conclusions drawn 
from 2009 alone.  
22 We tested the use of continuous earnings and age variables but these obscured important differences in patterns as 
earnings and age rose.   
23 Our focus groups suggested a distinct difference between part-time and full-time employees in their savings 
attitude and knowledge.  This may have been because part-time workers were more likely to be married and 
therefore financially more able to work only part time.   
24 From administrative data we have hours of work data for the year, but do not know when those hours are worked.  
We calculate average weekly hours over all 52 weeks.  Workers who persistently worked 45 hours or more per week 
throughout the year may be increasing their WRS earnings just prior to retirement, thereby raising their WRS 
formula benefit.  19 
 
When controlling for other attributes identifiable in the WDC administrative data, female 
employees contribute a significantly smaller percentage of their WRS covered earnings to their 
WDC accounts.  That percent is less by .5 percentage point, two-thirds of the difference in the 
raw average shown in Table 5 (.0075).  Being married is positively related to contributions, but 
the effect is significant only in specification 1.
25  Variation in contributions is a consequence in 
part of the influence of age, earnings, and whether the individual is a recent enrollee, especially 
in the most recent year.  It is not surprising that older individuals, perhaps becoming more aware 
and concerned about retirement resource needs as they approach retirement, contribute a higher 
percentage of income.  Contributions steadily increase as a percent of earnings.  In these 
administrative data, we can identify those who first contributed in the past three years.  We do 
this to assess the pattern of contribution changes over time and effects of later participation on 
account balances.
26  Contributions during the first years in the program are lower as a percentage 
of income; those who contributed first in 2009, 2008, and 2007 contributed significantly less out 
of their earnings than did those who were already contributing in 2006. We cannot plot the 
contribution path beyond these first three program years so do not know whether these lower 
ratios are merely a story about becoming acquainted with all benefits the first years of the 
program or reflects a longer educational process in understanding WDC and the importance of 
retirement savings.  Althought individuals may be more able to afford to contribute as earnings 
                                                 
25 Marital status may be an unreliable variable since it is not clear when that status was reported to WDC, which 
does not require updating.   
26 One concern of WDC administrators is that delays in participation are due to insufficient information about 
retirement resource needs which may be more likely underestimated by women.   20 
 
increase, it is also important to keep in mind that the maximum ratio they can legally contribute 
falls as earnings rise.  However, we find that the ratio of contributions rises with earnings, which 
indicates that higher earners are not constrained in making contributions by the maximums 
allowed.  Indeed, Table 8 shows that only a small percentage of employees contribute up to the 
maximum allowed.  Females are far less likely to contribute their legal maximum than are males.  
The inclusion of the hours worked variables in Table 7 adds modestly to the explanatory power 
of the regression and changes neither the size nor significance of explanatory variables with the 
notable exception of the lowest earnings categories.  Controlling for full-time versus part-time 
work, it appears that contributions are linearly related to earnings, rising steadily as a percentage 
of WRS earnings as earnings rise. The effect of being female rises with these controls.  
[Table 8 about here] 
In the last three columns of Table 7, we duplicate the analysis in the first three rows and 
expand the analysis with the inclusions of additional survey variables.  In the fourth column are 
results from the regression with variables defined as closely as possible to those of the 
administrative analysis.   The results are less precise because of a considerably smaller sample 
and bias towards responses by individuals with larger account balances.  Nevertheless, results are 
consistent with those from the administrative data—females contributed a smaller share of 
earnings in 2010 and this effect persists and actually increased with controls for other predictive 
factors.  Age and salary patterns also show ratios that climb with age and earnings.  Interestingly, 
marital status, here reported at the time of the survey, has no significant effect.  We 
experimented with several different definitions of marital status, including an interaction with 
gender and with spouse’s contributions to WDC if working for a job covered by WRS or WDC.  
No marital status variable had a significant effect on contributions by survey respondents.  We 21 
 
hypothesized that individuals who delayed enrolling in WDC may report higher contributions as 
they attempted to make up for foregone contributions and earnings on those amounts.  Hence we 
included a series of variables that measured the number of years between when first eligible to 
contribute and when the respondent did enroll.  Those who delayed enrollment had no different 
current contribution rate than did those who enrolled upon first eligibility.   
Given that Wisconsin state government employees are documented to have a relatively 
high level of education, we were curious whether observed earnings (and perhaps gender) effects 
could reflect education. 
27 In specification 5, education appears to have an influence distinct from 
gender, but specification 6 suggest the effect of higher earnings may be due to educational 
differences.  Having more than a BA has a strong positive effect on the contribution ratio, while 
wiping out the influence of higher salary.  The age and gender effects remain.     
Fund Growth.  Differences in fund growth, reflecting different investment strategies and 
withdrawal behavior, may also contribute to gender differences in account balances.   Although 
the period (2006-2009) of the WDC data was one of erratic market changes (Figure 1), these data 
may be informative of whether differences by gender in investment behavior matters to account 
balances as markets rise and fall over time.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
Table 9 tracks the sharp rise and fall in account earnings during this period, changes that 
would be due both to market earnings as well as new contributions and earnings (or losses) on 
them.  The later and earlier periods exhibit no gender difference in fund growth while female 
account holders suffered smaller losses than did men during 2007-2008.    
                                                 
27  Among survey respondents 62% had a college degree or higher.  Only 13% had only a HS diploma.   22 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
Table 10, which provides predictors of account balance at the end of each year, tells a 
somewhat different story.  The first three columns use administrative data, predicting account 
balances at the end of the specified year.  Not surprisingly, a major predictor of the balance at the 
end of each year is the contributions made during that year. The coefficient on this variable 
reflects the slow WDC fund growth in 2007-2008 relative to the previous year and the rapid 
investment growth in 2008-2009.
28  Similarly, the net gain in account balances from new 
contributions reflects market conditions.  In 2007 each $1.00 in contributions led on average to 
account gains of $1.09 because of additional earnings over the year on those contributions.  As 
markets fell in 2008 accounts gained on average by only $.71 from each $1.00 contributed.  
Recovery during 2008 led to a gain of an additional $.17 from each dollar contributed that year.  
When taking account of initial balances and new contributions, and the age of the account holder 
in 2009, WDC accounts of women grew more slowly.  Their 2009 balance was less than men’s 
by $487 after accounting for initial balance and 2008 contribution differences.  Whether this was 
                                                 
28 As described earlier, ETF oversees investments by WDC as well as by the Wisconsin Retirement System 
(pension) plan.  What is called the “Core” WRS funds grew in 2006-07 by +6.7 percent, fell by 26.2 percent in 
2007-08 and grew by 22.4 percent in 2008-09.  The “Variable Fund” changes were +5.6 percent, -39 percent and 
+33.7 percent in those years, respectively.  This is an indication of overall performance of WRS funds and may 
imply similar changes in WDC investment options overall.  However, while WRS participants’ funds are credited 
with a uniform annual investment gain/loss, only varying with the percentage of funds allocated between the 
variable and core funds,  WDC holders allocate contributions to specific investment options and may change that 
allocation without limit.  Thus gains experienced among WDC account holders vary based on that allocation and the 
growth of individuals’ chosen fund options.  23 
 
an aberration or consistent with long-term gender differences cannot be known from data for this 
period of unprecedented investment fluctuations.  It may be that, prior to 2008, gender did not 
play a role in fund growth—the gender effect in 2006-08 was positive but smaller in size and 
only significant at the .10 level in 2007.  However, that effect may also have been driven by 
short-term market changes. 
[Table 10 about here] 
Our survey asked only about current (in 2011) account balances and so we cannot 
conduct a comparable analysis of fund growth using these data.  However, the last column of 
Table 10, shows predictors of 2011 fund balances. When accounting for contribution ratio 
differences across individuals there remains a gender influence—female account holders have 
lower balances.  Gender-related behavior would already be reflected in contribution differences 
(in 2010) as well as in years worked in a state job, in the probability of ever having rolled in 
contributions from other tax-deferred accounts, and in delayed participation.   
Table 11 uses the limited indicators in the administrative data of individuals’ investment 
strategies to understand whether there may be gender differences in fund management that have 
consequences for the overall gender disparity in account balances and growth.  These include the 
number of different options among which the individual’s funds are distributed and the number 
of times individuals accessed account information.
29   Unfortunately, those data are only 
available for 2009 and, therefore, we do not know  how allocation decisions affected differential 
                                                 
29 WDC offers an array of investment options (See www.fascore.com/PDF/wisconsin/spectrum.pdf) and the freedom 
to individual account holders to move funds away from or into investment options as they wish either on-line or by 
telephone.  The administrative data do not indicate the type of funds held by individuals.   24 
 
fund growth in the long run.  Controlling for diversification (number of options) and age, women 
and men experienced the same gains on existing accounts and new contributions.  The inclusion 
of those variables reduces the coefficient on the female variable only marginally (Table 10, 
column 1).  For both men and women, having their WDC account allocated to fewer options 
(less diversification) was associated with slower growth, implying that fund allocation does 
matter to account growth over time.
30   Table 12 shows that women were somewhat more likely 
to have funds allocated to only one investment option in 2009.  That a gender imbalance remains 
in our predictive estimates of fund growth and balance after accounting for initial funds or 
contribution rates is consistent with although not necessarily reflecting different investment 
strategies of women and men.   
Interestingly, accessing account information more frequently is negatively predictive of 
growth, a result that may reflect personality factors that influence more fund monitoring and 
earnings anxiety.  Both “strategy” effects—fewer accounts and more frequent accessing of 
accounts—could be a consequence of reactions to a volatile market; individuals who sold high 
and moved assets into fewer “safer” investment options would have lost as the market fell and 
experienced less growth as the market rose.  It may also be that these concerned individuals were 
                                                 
30 The negative coefficient does not necessary mean that these investment options lost value, just that controlling for 
other sources of gains (and losses) individuals whose WDC accounts were in only one investment option  had a 
2009 account balance that was on average $3,619 below the balances of individuals with funds allocated across 
eight of more options. 25 
 
more likely to make those changes through web access.
31  Checking accounts online would have 
no effect if WDC account holders were simply checking their accounts with no necessary 
intention to make changes. 
 [Tables 11 and 12 about here] 
Persistence of Contribution Status and Maximum Contributions.  We close our analysis of 
account balance differences by saying more about maximum contributions, mentioned briefly 
above, and examining gender differences in contribution cessation. Table 13 shows that the log 
odds of contributing maximum allowed contributions in 2009 among all WDC account holders 
and, for survey respondents, the probability of having ever contributed the maximum allowed.  
In 2009, higher earners and older employees are more likely to currently or ever have made 
maximum allowed WDC contributions. The lowest wage earners, for whom maximum 
contributions may be up to 100 percent of income, are also more likely to contribute in 2009, but 
not more so than the highest earners.  Consistent with our contribution predictive estimates, 
women are significantly less likely to have in 2009 or ever made maximum allowed 
contributions.  
[Table 13 about here] 
The WDC annual reports include data suggesting that among all WDC account holders 
(including educational institutions and local government employees) women account holders are 
more likely than males to temporarily cease contributing.  Table 14 shows the probability in each 
                                                 
31 WDC offers an array of investment options (See www.fascore.com/PDF/wisconsin/spectrum.pdf) and the freedom 
to individual account holders to move funds away from or into investment options as they wish either on-line or by 
telephone.   26 
 
of 2007, 2008, and 2009 that an account holder in our study sample who had contributed in the 
previous year and was still an account holder at the end of that year had not contributed at all in 
that calendar year. Although females are somewhat more likely to cease contributing, the 
probability is different by only a small percentage points (.3 across all years).  We attempted to 
predict the probability of ceasing contributions, but the available characteristics had very little 
predictive value as a group or individually.  Gender was significant in one year with only a small 
effect.  Cessation is poorly measured in the administrative data, however, since cessations that 
took place during the year would not be recorded.  It is also likely that cessations occur because 
of changes in personal and job characteristics, data that are not necessary for WDC 
administrative purposes and, therefore, not gathered.  
[Table 14 about here] 
Conclusions 
  The WDC administrative data allowed the exploration of factors predictive of 
contributions as a percentage of salary and of account balances.  Administrative data provided 
account information on all state employees who had a WDC account during the 2006-09 period, 
but limited information on personal characteristics.  The survey data were for this same group of 
individuals, but was for a smaller sample which evidenced response bias by higher earning 
employees.  Nevertheless the survey analysis confirmed conclusions drawn from the 
administrative data: females have lower account balances because they contribute a smaller 
percentage of salary to WDC for reasons that are not evident in either data set.  The survey 
which included information on marital status, children, years of work, and state agency provided 
no evidence that these characteristics had an effect.  Lower earnings do limit one’s financial 
ability to save for retirement and greater age makes retirement savings a more salient reason for 27 
 
savings. Indeed, higher earners and older employees contribute a higher proportion of their WRS 
earnings to WDC.  Thus we do not contradict research, which find that earning differentials 
explain much of the difference in retirement plan participation and contributions (Copeland 
2005; Papke, Walker, and Dworksy 2009).   Table 15 shows that salaries of women Wisconsin 
state employees are skewed towards lower earnings.   
However, we find that, even as earnings rise, women continue to contribute less to their 
retirement accounts as a proportion of salary.  The survey analysis suggests that the wage effect 
may reflect educational differences.  Accounting for the effects of education and earnings, 
women does not reduce the effect of gender on contributions.    
Despite the fact that the WDC data do not allow an investigation of the participation 
decision, the aggregate data provided by ETF indicate that women on average have comparable 
participation rates to male employees. The analysis of participation across agencies and counties 
suggests that macro-differences in the WDC or other benefit policies are not the major reason for 
variation in participation.  Therefore specific agency policy is unlikely to play a major role in 
participation decisions—and probably the contribution decisions—of eligible employees. This, 
however, is limited evidence of that potential effect. 
Some have argued that women may have lower total retirement savings because they are 
less willing to make high risk-high return investments (See Schubert, Gysler, Brown, and 
Brachinger (1999) for a review of that literature and reasons why this difference is observed.)  
There is some evidence from the analysis presented here that this may be the case.   Even when 
accounting for differences between men and women in WDC contributions, women have lower 
WDC account balances.  One reason for that could be different long-term investment strategies, 
given WDC contributions.  The 2009 administrative data indicate that less diversification in 28 
 
investment options leads to slower fund growth and women’s accounts are somewhat less 
diversified than are men’s. Given the volatility in the stock market during the 2006-09 period, we 
are reluctant to draw conclusions about women’s long-run diversification behavior.  When asked 
in the survey how they had changed contributions during the volatile stock market years, women 
were no more likely to say they had ceased or reduced contributions.  However, if women were 
more likely to move funds to “safe havens,” that effect would appear in the coefficient on the 
female variable.
 32    Finally, the maximum contribution limits is a potential constraint on 
contributions for only a small percent of contributors, including at the lowest earnings level 
where the 100 percent of earnings limit could be binding.  Women are less likely to make in one 
year or to have ever made the maximum contribution. 
This analysis provided further insight into the lower retirement savings of women.  It also 
adds to the puzzle, since for this sample pension coverage or savings options are not a factor.   
Our results suggest that, while earnings matter, women contribute less as a percentage of their 
salaries.  Why this is the case remains a puzzle, although it does suggest that women may need 
more information on the importance of saving for retirement.  
    
                                                 
32 Some women in the focus groups (see footnote 3) said they had shifted investments to safer and slower growth 
investments as markets fell. 29 
 
 
Table 1: Gender Disparities: All WDC Account Holders 
Year 
Number of
WDC Account holders 
Average WDC
Account Balances 
Percent of Account Holders Taking 
Hardship Withdrawals 
Male  Female  Male  Female 
Ratio 
Female/ 
Male  Male  Female 
2007  23,408  22,493  $59,000 $41,000 .69 .18  .24
2008  24,282  23,622  $44,000 $31,000 .70 .21  .22
2009  24,896  24,622  $52,000 $38,000 .73 .20  .28
2010  25,489  25,485  $60,000 $42,000 .70 .25  .35
2011  25,776  25,802  $60,500 $42,000 .70 .23  .37
Note: Data are from WDC annual statistics report. Account balances and percentage of account holders taking 
hardship withdrawals are directly read from report graphs. Percentage of participants taking hardship withdrawals 
in 2007 and 2008 are computed as the ratio of the number of participants taking hardships over number of 
participants 
Source: WDC Annual Reports  
 
Table 2: Account Balances: All WDC Account Holders, State of Wisconsin Employees and Survey Respondents
 
Number of Account 
Holders  
Account Balance of 
All WDC Account 
Holders  Ratio of Female/Male 
Balances  Male Female Male Female 
All WDC Account Holders 
2009  24,896 24,622 $52,000  $38,000   0.73
2010  25,489 25,485 $60,962  $42,561   0.70
Wisconsin State Workers, Account Holders*
2009 Administrative Data    
Full Sample   10,496 10,423 $62,502  $42,842   0.69
Study Sample   8,941 9,159 $53,874  $38,923   0.72
Contributors  8,195 8,298 $55,155  $40,071   0.73
Non‐Contributors 746 861 $39,810  $27,863   0.70
2011 Survey   357 353 $78,674 $50,973  0.65
*Account holders are defined as anyone with a positive account balance
Source: WDC Annual Reports and authors calculations from WDC administrative data and survey 
Not all survey respondents provided an account total.  Account balances only reported for those who gave totals. 
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Table 3: State of Wisconsin Employee WDC Participation, 2009
  
Number of 
Employees Eligible 
to Participate in 
the WDC 
Number of 
Employees with 
WDC Accounts  
Percent of 
Employees with 
Accounts 
Number of 
Employees with 
Accounts 
Contributing to 
Accounts 
Percent of 
Account Holders 
Contributing 
Male  16,932  9,523 56.2% 8,696 91.3%
Female  16,687  9,480 56.8% 8,563 90.3%
Data are for full sample of state employee, excluding those reporting no hours of work in 2009.  
Source: Authors calculations from WDC and ETF administrative data 
 
 
Table 4: WDC Participation Rates by County, Actual and Agency‐Standardized Rates
 
County  Participation Rate 
Difference Between Dane and County Rate
(In Percentage Points) 
Actual Rate 
Standardized by Agency 
Distribution 
Dane  46.1 0.00 0.00
Brown  52.7 6.54 3.01
Douglas  43.4 ‐2.69 ‐6.35
Fond Du Lac  40.7 ‐5.43 ‐1.37
Kenosha  47.4 1.23 9.93
La Crosse  67.7 21.55 12.02
Milwaukee  50.1 4.00 3.15
Oneida  56.2 10.09 10.34
Outagamie  54.4 8.21 18.57
Racine  36.4 ‐9.79 11.40
Waukesha  57.2 11.05 9.55
Winnebago  30.7 ‐15.44 14.55
Note: Rates are calculated for employees in nine agencies which had employees in each of the counties
Source: Authors’ calculation from ETF data. 
 
Table 5: Contribution‐Wage Ratio by Gender: 2006‐2009 (% salary contributed) 
Year  Males Females T test
Administrative Data 
  2006  7.79 7.10 4.96***
  2007  7.55 6.91 4.94***
  2008  7.42 6.78 5.09***
  2009  7.03 6.28 6.28***
Survey  
  2010  8.02 6.53 2.06**
2006‐09 ratios calculated for study sample.  See Table 3 and text.
***Difference between males and females is significant at p<.01 
**Difference between males and females is significant at p<.05 
Source: Authors’ calculations from WDC administrative and survey data. 31 
 
Table 6: Maximum Contribution‐Wage Ratio by Gender: 2006‐2009
Year  Males Females T test
2006  30.84 37.09 ‐27.76***
2007  30.99 37.23 ‐26.92***
2008  29.18 34.88 ‐25.62***
2009  31.22 36.95 ‐25.41***
***Difference between males and females is significant at p<.01
Ratio calculated for Study Sample.  See Table 3 and text. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from WDC administrative data. 
 
 
Table 7:  Predictors of WDC Contribution Ratios
  WDC Administrative data‐‐2009 Survey—2011
(1) (2) (3) (1)  (2)  (3)
Constant  0.052*** 0.086*** 0.090*** 0.053**  0.021
***  0.064**
Female ‐ 0.005*** ‐.006*** ‐.007*** ‐0.012* ‐ 0.012* ‐ 0.013*
Education >BA  0.020***  0.016*
Married  0.002* 0.002 0.001 0.004   0.004
2009 Earnings ($30‐50,000 excluded) 
< $10,000  0.046*** 0.013* 0.010 0.154**   0.143*
$10‐$30,000  0.012*** ‐0.012*** ‐0.014*** 0.003  ‐ 0.002
$50‐$70,000  0.007*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.008   0.004
$70‐$90,000  0.020*** 0.022*** 0.024*** ‐0.004  ‐ 0.008
> $90,000  0.028*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.029**   0.019
2009 Age (40‐49 years excluded) 
21‐29 years  ‐0.009*** ‐0.008*** ‐0.008*** ‐0.004  ‐ 0.008
30‐39  ‐0.010*** ‐0.009*** ‐0.009*** 0.002   0.001
50‐59  0.024*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.034***
    0.034***
60+  0.042*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.050***  0.049***
Timing of WDC contributions  (col 1 for admin data; col 2 survey)
     First in 2007  Delay 1‐3 yrs  ‐0.013*** ‐0.012*** ‐0.012*** 0.008   0.002
     First in 2008  Delay 4‐6 yrs  ‐0.009*** ‐0.008*** ‐0.008*** 0.010   0.003
     First in2009  Delay 7+ yrs  ‐0.033*** ‐0.033*** ‐0.033*** ‐0.001   0.006
Full‐time work   ‐0.037*** ‐0.040*** ‐0.007  ‐ 0.018
 45+ hours per week ‐ 0.021***  
Observations  16,566 16,566 16,566 455 460  448
 R‐squared  .096 .110 .115 0.0703  0.024  0.109
***Difference between this and comparison category is significant at p<..01; ** at p<.05; * p<..1 
Source: Authors’ calculations from WDC administrative and survey data. 
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Table 8: Percent Contributing Allowable Maximum to WDC: 2009 and ever
Income Quartile  Males  Females  T test
Contributing maximum in 2009  
1  1.09% 0.55% 2.03**
2  1.43% 1.10% 1.04
3  2.66% 2.93% ‐0.56
4  11.33 9.72% 1.69*
Total  4.65% 2.89%  
Ever Contributed  19.03% 11.34% 3.21***
Source: Author’s calculations from WDC administrative and survey data33 
 
 
Table 9 : WDC Account Growth:  Averages over Three Periods 
Year  Males  Females  T test
2006‐2007  66.6% 76.4% ‐0.70
2007‐2008 ‐ 13.1% ‐9.8%       ‐3.07***
2008‐2009  42.1% 42.8% ‐0.33
*** significant at p<.01 
Estimates are for Study Sample.  See Table 3 and text.  Growth includes new contributions and roll‐overs. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from WDC administrative data 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 10: Predictors of Account Balances 
  2009 Balance 2008 Balance 2007 Balance  Survey
Female ‐ 487.0*** 197.0 208.9* ‐ 13,948**
Married ‐ 29.66 ‐176.3 ‐28.38  4,945
Prior year balance  1.171*** 0.731*** 1.091*** 
Contribution ratio 2010 (%)  554,495***
Contributions during year  1.438*** 0.907*** 1.102*** 
Ever roll funds into WDC  25,145*
Years worked for WI state        3,551***
Age (40‐49 years excluded) 
20‐29 years  ‐1,331*** 1,074** ‐234.6  4,807
30‐39 years  ‐729.5*** 334.2 ‐110.8 ‐ 6,680
50‐59 years  ‐1,029*** 2,333*** ‐352.2***  3,459
60+ years  ‐2,760*** 5,980*** ‐581.5**  17,050
Gap in enrollment (No gap excluded) 
1‐3 years  41,766*
4‐6 years  36,588
7+ years  ‐33,455
Education (>BA)  34,661***
Constant  1,484*** ‐1,282*** 63.25 ‐ 33,455
Observations  17,027 16,789 16,293  405
R‐squared  0.983 0.959 0.992  0.480
End of year balances in 2007 – 2009.  Balance at time of response to survey question (2011). 
Source: Authors’ calculations from WDC administrative and survey data. 34 
 
Table 11: Predictors of 2009 WDC Fund Balance by Gender
  All Men Women
Female ‐ 448.3***
Married ‐ 37.66 48.71 ‐98.09
2008 WDC account balance 1.168*** 1.171*** 1.164***
2009 contributions   1.415*** 1.401*** 1.440***
Age (40‐49 years excluded) 
20‐29 years  ‐851.1** ‐1,314** ‐337.2
30‐39 years  ‐817.8*** ‐1,213*** ‐438.7**
50‐59 years  ‐855.7*** ‐1,249*** ‐468.1***
60+ years  ‐2,337*** ‐2,815*** ‐1,855***
VRU use 
a  ‐1.728 3.458 ‐15.48**
WDC use 
b   ‐91.69*** ‐68.78** ‐187.0***
Number funds (8+ excluded) 
   1  ‐3,619*** ‐4,726*** ‐2,764***
   2‐3  ‐1,943*** ‐1,925*** ‐1,982***
   4‐5  ‐359.1* ‐474.3 ‐248.3
   6‐7  64.89 86.31 35.70
Constant  2,671*** 2,981*** 1,906***
Observations  17,027 8,514 8,513
R‐squared  0.984 0.980 0.988
a  Number of times participant accessed account information using voice response system (where participants call 
in to either to use the automated service or speak to a representative) in 6 months prior to 2/2010 
b Number of times participant accessed account information using web in 6 months prior to 2/2010 
*** significant at p<.01; ** significant at p<.05; * significant at p<.10 
Source: Authors’ calculations from WDC administrative data 
 
Table 12:  Distribution of Account Holders by Number of WDC Funds Held, 2009
Number funds  Total Males Female
1 fund  18.4% 16.0%     20.7%***
2‐3 funds  22.0% 22.9%    21.2%***
4‐5 funds  23.2% 24.9%     21.6%***
6‐7 funds  19.1% 19.0% 19.1%
8+ funds  17.3% 17.2% 17.4%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
*** significant difference between males and females percent at p<.01
Source: Author’s calculations from WDC administrative data 
 35 
 
 
Table 13: Predictors of Maximum Contributions: Odds Ratio
  WDC administrative data‐In 2009 Survey: Ever Made
Female  0.817** 0.476*** 
Married  0.863* 0.783 
2009 Earnings ($30‐50,000 excluded) 
< $10,000  3.519***
1 
$10‐$30,000  0.154*** 0.784 
$50‐$70,000  1.378** 2.283* 
$70‐$90,000  3.598*** 2.963** 
> $90,000  11.07*** 10.264*** 
2009 Age (40‐49 years excluded) 
21‐29  0.297
1 
30‐39  0.575 0.468 
50‐59  11.44*** 2.721** 
60+  21.62*** 4.294*** 
Timing of WDC contributions (col 1 for administrative data, col. 2 survey)
    First in 2007  Delay 1‐3 yrs  1.187 1.565 
First in 2008  Delay 4‐6 yrs  0.988 1.473 
First in 2009  Delay 7+ yrs  0.467** .517 
Constant  0.00437*** 0.401*** 
Observations  17,185 608 
Pseudo R‐squared  0.261 .169 
***Difference between this and comparison category is significant at p<.01; **P<.05; * p<..1 
1.  observations are perfectly correlated with outcome (=1) 
Source: Authors’ calculations from WDC administrative and survey data. 
 
 
 
 
Table 14:  Percent of Previous Year Contributors not Contributing in Next Year
No contributions in:  Males  Females  
2007  4.18 4.48 
2008  5.32 5.64 
2009  5.79 6.18 
Estimates are for Study Sample.  See Table 3 and text. Estimates for individuals making any WDC contributions in 
prior year and still holding an account in indicated year.   
Source: Authors’ calculations from WDC administrative data. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Dow Jones Industrial Average, 2006-10 
 
 
Source: Retrieved from http://money.cnn.com/data/markets/dow/ 
 
    
Table 15: WRS Covered Earnings Among WDC Contributors with Earnings, 2006‐2009 
Year  Male  Female 
Ratios of Female/Male Means 
Overall mean Of lowest quartile  Of highest quartile
2006  $ 54,927  $45,136 *** .822 .800 .832
N   10,447   10,406 
2007  $57,720  $47,262 *** .819 .789 .835
N   10,396   10,369
2008  $61,487  $50,913 *** .828 .795 .844
N   10,130   10,111      
2009  $61,357  $51,405 *** .838 .812 .851
N   9,725   9,769   
Quartiles are for each gender.  Thus the ratio is of the mean of women in the lowest (highest) quartile of their 
earnings distribution to the men in the lowest (highest) quartile of that distribution. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from WDC and ETF linked data.  
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Appendix A: Comparison of Tax Advantaged Retirement Savings Options 
The following table compares key provisions of the retirement plan options available to Wisconsin public employees: the mandatory 
defined benefit plan (WRS) covering eligible public employees, 403(b) plans offered to employees in public education institutions, 
and the WDC program. 
Table A1: Comparison of the Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS), Wisconsin Deferred Compensation (WDC) and other Tax‐Deferred Annuities (TDA) 
   WRS WDC  TDA
Description  401(a) defined benefit plan.  Retirees 
receive a life‐time annuity determined by 
either a formula or total account balance, 
whichever is higher 
s. 457(b) defined contribution plan, which 
covers the employees of participating 
government and public sector employers.
s. 403(b) defined contribution plans, for 
employees in education and non‐profit 
employers 
Participation  
Employee Group  Employees of the state, public universities 
and technical colleges, public school 
districts, and local government 
Employees of a participating public entity. 
Only optional plan for State of Wisconsin 
employees; may be one of several options 
for local government employees. 
Employees of a participating public 
entity 
Eligibility  Mandatory; must be employed to 
contribute 
Voluntary; must be employed to 
contribute 
Voluntary
Contributions  
Tax status  Pre‐tax contributions Pre‐tax contributions  Pre‐tax contributions
Individuals’ Contributions 
and Limits 
Now paid largely by employer under 
union/contract agreement. Legislative 
proposals may change this.  Statutory 
employee contributions are: General 
employees and teachers: 5%; Executives: 
3.2%; Protective Service with Social 
Security: 5.5%; Protective Services 
without Social Security:  3.9% 
Lesser of 100% gross income or $16,500; 
this does not need to be coordinate with 
403(b) contributions 
Lesser of 100% salary or $16,500; this
does not need to be coordinate with 
457(b) contributions but limit applies to 
all TDA plans combined.  
 
 
 
 
   WRS WDC  TDA
Catch Up Contribution 
Rules 
None  Two (can only use one option in any given 
year): 
Age 50 Catch‐Up. If 50 or older  can 
contribute additional $5,500 annually 
Standard Catch‐Up. If you are within 3 
years of your normal retirement age1 and 
undercontributed in prior years, you may 
contribute up to an additional $16,500 
This amounts to a total possible maximum 
contribution of $33,000. 
If you are older than 50, you can 
contribute an extra $5,500 annually 
Minimum Age for Permitted 
Distribution 
55 (protective service at 50) Employment termination; no early 
penalty 
Early penalty if younger than 59.5
Required Distribution Age  70.5 age rules apply 70.5 age rules apply  70.5 age rules apply
Receipt age (without penalty)  General employees: 65, make take 
employee‐only contributions as a 
"separation benefit" at termination of 
employment (this is usually 1/2 of money 
purchase benefit) 
Earlier of 70.5 or employment termination 59.5 even if employed
Penalty   no penalty no penalty 10% if <59.5 unless annuitized
Payout Distribution 
  Options  Annuity (if over $348/mo threshold) Annuity, lump‐sum, partial annuity, or 
periodic 
Varies with fund
  Annuity options  Life annuity, joint and survivor Life annuity; periodic; annuity certain Annuity, lump‐sum, periodic, and 
interest‐only  
  Early distributions  Not possible before 55; age reduction 
factors may apply between 55 and 65 
No early withdrawal penalty Early withdrawal penalty except for 
hardship/disability 
Investment Option  100% in core, or 50% in variable; all 
managed by State of WI Investment Board 
(SWIB) 
Employee chooses from plan options ‐
mutual funds (bonds, stocks, balanced) & 
fixed (money market, FDIC, stable value). 
Also offers lifecycle/target date, managed 
accounts & self‐directed brokerage 
options 
Employee choses options from 
individual plan offerings ‐ fixed, variable, 
mutual funds  
 
 
 
 
   WRS WDC  TDA
If leaving employment  May leave in WRS; SWIB manages money 
and accumulates returns 
May leave in WDC. Worker manages 
account (fund options, balances, 
beneficiaries, etc.) and account 
accumulates returns 
Employer must offer option to retain 
funds in plan 
Roth Accounts  ‐‐‐  Permitted as of January 1, 2011 Allowed
Loans  No  No Only if specific plan permits
Financial  Emergency Hardship 
Distributions 
No  Yes Only if specific plan permits
Roll‐overs  Out only  Out and In Out and In, if plan permits
Regulations  Not ERISA covered Not ERISA covered  ERISA covered
Note: * = deferred earnings equals the sum of 457, 403(b), 127 ERA contributions 
 
Source: WDC (http://www.wdc457.org); WRS (http://etf.wi.us); WRS Additional (http://etf.wi.gov/members/benefits_addl_cont.htm); 457 Plans 
(http://www.nagdca.org/documents/Evolution_of_the_Government_Deferred_Compensation_Plan_Market.pdf), general 403(b) infor 
(http://www.irs.gov/pbulications/p571/index.html) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Appendix B: Aggregate WDC Participation Rates 
 
See text for the analysis of agency effects on county participation rates.  Table B1 presents the data used.  The analysis was restricted 
to counties in which a common set of agencies had at least one employee.  
 
 
 
Table B1: WDC Participation Rate in 2009: Selected Counties and Agencies
County 
Dept. of Ag. 
Trade and 
Consumer 
Protection 
Dept. of 
Natural 
Resources 
Dept. of 
Transportation 
Dept. of 
Corrections 
Dept. of 
Health 
Services 
Dept. of 
Workforce 
Development 
Office of 
WI Public 
Defender 
Dept. of 
Revenue 
Circuit 
Courts 
Brown  35.00%  61.07% 59.57% 20.00% 52.38%  35.90% 15.79% 43.33% 41.18%
Dane  48.12%  42.71% 55.78% 40.96% 39.74%  40.75% 52.25% 40.19% 56.41%
Douglas  14.29%  31.58% 72.60% 57.89% 50.00%  30.00% 28.57% 0.00% 83.33%
Fond Du Lac  33.33%  11.11% 65.91% 31.58% 0.00%  33.33% 10.00% 100.00% 40.00%
Kenosha  0.00%  100.00% 54.55% 0.00% 0.00%  47.62% 42.11% 75.00% 47.06%
La Crosse  66.67%  62.12% 77.95% 77.42% 0.00%  46.43% 41.18% 50.00% 69.23%
Milwaukee  63.64%  62.03% 43.20% 27.78% 25.71%  47.80% 55.84% 53.92% 50.00%
Oneida  0.00%  49.72% 73.33% 50.00% 64.71%  50.00% 33.33% 66.67% 60.00%
Ouagamie  33.33%  60.00% 93.33% 0.00% 100.00%  48.08% 46.15% 47.62% 62.50%
Racine  66.67%  52.54% 56.25% 61.54% 30.66%  61.11% 23.08% 75.00% 90.00%
Waukesha  42.86%  38.58% 63.73% 50.00% 80.00%  58.62% 47.83% 57.14% 52.00%
Winnebago  50.00%  52.63% 85.71% 7.14% 30.68%  44.74% 44.44% 75.00% 64.29%
Source:  Author’s calculations from ETF provided administrative data.